

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

DUBLIN DIVISION

FILED  
U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
AUG 29 2008

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                     )  
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   )             CR 308-006  
   )  
   )  
EDDIE LEE CARSWELL                             )  
MARK ANTHONY CARSWELL                        )

**ORDER**

Before the Court are the various pre-trial and discovery motions filed by Defendant Mark Anthony Carswell.<sup>1</sup> The United States of America, by and through its attorney, Edmund A. Booth, Jr., United States Attorney, and Nancy C. Greenwood, Assistant United States Attorney, has filed a combined response to these motions and made motions of its own.

**GENERAL DISCOVERY MOTION**

As to Defendant's general discovery requests, (doc. no. 33), the government responds that it has provided "open file" discovery in this case. The government has provided and made available 252 pages and one CD-ROM of discovery materials consisting of the investigation reports of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and the United States Attorney's Office (attorney and agent work product excepted). All known statements by Defendant have also been produced or made available to him, as has his

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<sup>1</sup>Defendant Eddie Lee Carswell did not file any motions. Unless otherwise specifically indicated, the use of "Defendant" herein shall refer to Defendant Mark Anthony Carswell.

criminal record. The results of any scientific tests have been provided in the discovery materials, but if any further tests are conducted, the results will be provided upon their receipt. Accordingly, the Court finds that the position of the United States Attorney in permitting full disclosure of the government's file pertaining to this case renders Defendant's discovery requests **MOOT**.

However, to ensure that Defendant's requests are in fact covered by the government's disclosures, the Court hereby requires counsel for Defendant to submit not later than five (5) days from the date of this Order a written statement describing any existing disputes or unresolved items that have not been specifically addressed elsewhere in this Order. The statement should detail the specific items sought and should include a memorandum of law.

Defense counsel is reminded that dissemination of discovery material beyond that necessary to the preparation of the defense is prohibited by Loc. Crim. R. 16.1.

Any discovery material turned over to Defendant shall be maintained by Defendant and not further disseminated. Failure to comply with the terms of this Order may result in contempt proceedings. Further addressing Defendant's specific requests for disclosure:

**1. NOTICE OF EVIDENCE SUBJECT TO SUPPRESSION:**

The purpose of this request is to give Defendant advance notice of any arguably suppressible evidence which will be used at trial. In this case, the attorney for the government has granted liberal discovery, giving Defendant access to the government's investigative file. This discovery should eliminate the possibility of surprise at trial. Therefore, the request is **DENIED**.

## 2. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS:

In light of the government's liberal discovery policy, and in light of the government's disclosure that all known statements by Defendant have also been produced or made available to him (doc. no. 34, p. 2), this request is **MOOT**.

## 3. "CATCHALL" HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS:

The Court trusts that counsel for the government is thoroughly familiar with the notice requirements of Rule 807 and will provide such notice to Defendant.

## 4. CO-CONSPIRATORS' HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS:

Defendant seeks an order compelling the government to disclose all co-conspirator statements. In support of his request, Defendant argues that the language of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A), which requires disclosure of "statements made by the defendant(s)," mandates disclosure of co-conspirator statements, since those statements are imputed to Defendant under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Unfortunately for Defendant, the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that these independent provisions cannot be read *in pari materia*. United States v. Orr, 825 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1987) (*en banc*) (adopting the reasoning of United States v. Roberts, 811 F.2d 257, 258 (4th Cir. 1987) (*en banc*)). The policy underlying nondisclosure of co-conspirator statements rests firmly on the belief that disclosure would unnecessarily promote both the intimidation of witnesses and attempts to suborn perjury. Roberts, 811 F.2d at 259 (citing United States v. Jackson, 757 F.2d 1486, 1493 (4th Cir. 1985) (Wilkinson, J, concurring)). The Jackson concurrence correctly noted that nothing in Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A), can be read to require disclosure of co-conspirator statements and that decisions relied on by the defendant justifying discovery of

such statements as "vicarious admissions" of defendants "make one person out of two and beg the question of undue pressure which may result." Jackson, 757 F.2d at 1493. Rule 16(a)(1)(A) requires the government to disclose "the substance of any relevant oral statement made by the defendant." Any discovery of co-conspirator statements must be pursuant to the provisions of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, or not at all. Roberts, 811 F.2d at 259. Therefore, Defendant's request for disclosure of co-conspirator statements is **DENIED**.

**5. DEFENDANT'S PRIOR RECORD:**

The government has responded that it has provided Defendant's known criminal record to him in discovery. This request is therefore, **MOOT**.

**6. DOCUMENTS AND TANGIBLE OBJECTS:**

The government has indicated its willingness to comply with this request, and Defendant's request is therefore, **MOOT**.

**7. WITNESS NAMES AND ADDRESSES:**

Defendant requests that the government be ordered to furnish a complete list of witnesses and their addresses. In non-capital cases such as this case, a defendant is generally not entitled to a list of government witnesses. United States v. Massell, 823 F.2d 1503, 1509 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 654, 659 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Colson, 662 F.2d 1389, 1391 (11th Cir. 1981). However, as a practical matter, it would appear that Defendant will be receiving much of this information because of the government's liberal discovery policy and because of the government's obligation to disclose material pursuant to the Jencks Act and/or Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). This, in essence, moots Defendant's request. While this Court retains the right to exercise its

discretion in permitting Defendant to have access to a list of government witnesses, at most the government would be required to comply with his request not more than ten (10) days prior to trial. Therefore, this request is **DENIED**.

**8. CRIMINAL RECORDS OF ALL WITNESSES:**

Defendant seeks disclosure of prior criminal conduct and uncharged bad acts of all witnesses. The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant an opportunity to impeach through cross examination the testimony of witnesses for the prosecution. United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1318 (11th Cir. 2006) (*en banc*); United States v. Lyons, 403 F.3d 1248, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 997 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1370 (11th Cir. 1994). This right is not, however, unlimited. While Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) allows cross examination of a witness as to specific instances of misconduct, the government does not have a duty to investigate each witness. This Rule must also be construed to limit cross examination to those acts of conduct "which are generally agreed to indicate a lack of truthfulness." 4-608 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 608.22. The types of acts which satisfy this strict test are forgery, bribery, cheating, embezzlement, false pretenses, fraud and perjury. Id. Moreover, the government has stated its willingness to provide, one week prior to trial, rap sheets or criminal convictions of witnesses which the government learns about and which could properly be used for impeachment under Fed. R. Crim. P. 609. (Doc. no. 34, p. 1). Beyond the government's continuing duty to disclose under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the parameters discussed herein, Defendant's request is **DENIED**.

**9. WRITTEN STATEMENTS OF PERSONS NOT CALLED AS WITNESSES:**

Defendant argues that pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 (a)(1)(C), he is entitled to disclosure of statements of witnesses the government does not intend to call as witnesses.<sup>2</sup>

The Court disagrees. Rule 16(a)(1)(E) provides:

Upon a defendant's request, the government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions of any of these items, if the item is within the government's possession, custody, or control and:

- (i) the item is material to preparing the defense;
- (ii) the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial; or
- (iii) the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant.

Under this Rule, a defendant is entitled to discover certain materials if they are either (1) material to the preparation of the defense, or (2) intended by the government to be used as evidence, or (3) were obtained from the defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). However, this Rule is qualified and limited by Rule 16(a)(2), which provides:

Except as Rule 16(a)(1) provides otherwise, this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by an attorney for the government or other government agent in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case. Nor does this rule authorize the discovery or inspection of statements made by prospective government witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.

It can be seen that Rule 16(a)(2) prevents the "discovery or inspection of statements made by prospective government witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500." Even if the statements satisfy one of the requirements of Rule 16(a)(1)(E), discovery by a defendant is

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<sup>2</sup>It appears that Defendant may have actually intended to reference Rule 16(a)(1)(E). The rule cited, Rule 16(a)(1)(C), applies to an organizational defendant. There is no such defendant in this case.

still barred by Rule 16(a)(2) unless those witnesses will testify at trial. In that case, the statements would be discoverable pursuant to the Jencks Act. See generally United States v. Schier, 438 F.3d 1104, 1112 (11th Cir. 2006) (reviewing requirements for disclosure of statements of witnesses testifying at trial and explicitly noting that “Jencks Act does not apply to the statements of non-testifying witnesses”). The statements of persons the government does not intend to call as witnesses at trial amount, therefore, to nothing more than internal memoranda, discovery of which is not permitted pursuant to the explicit mandate of Rule 16(a)(2). If the statements are not otherwise discoverable pursuant to the rule in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its progeny and no showing of materiality is made, they are not discoverable at all.

**10. INFORMANT’S NAME, IDENTITY AND WHEREABOUTS:**

Counsel for Defendant seeks the disclosure of the identity of any informants whose testimony the government intends to use at trial. Where the informant was not an active participant in the criminal activity, disclosure is not required. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61-63 (1957); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Parikh, 858 F.2d 688, 696 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Moreno, 588 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 1979). The government must disclose the identity of any informant who played an active role in the criminal activity charged against Defendant at least fourteen (14) days prior to trial. Such disclosure will ensure an adequate opportunity for Defendant to prepare for trial and obviate any need for an *in camera* showing by the government pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d). See United States v. Kerris, 748 F.2d 610, 614 (11th Cir. 1984) (*per curiam*) (re-iterating circuit precedent that *in camera* hearing not automatically

required when informant identity requested). Defendant's request for discovery of informants is therefore, **GRANTED**, as set forth herein.

**11. REPORTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF SCIENTIFIC TESTS OR ANALYSIS:**

Defendant requests the production of all written reports of any scientific analysis or chemical analysis conducted by the government. The government states that if any scientific tests were conducted and the results are available, those results have been included in the discovery materials. (Doc. no. 34, p. 2). Therefore, this request is **MOOT**.

**12. EXEMPLARS OF TESTS, FINGERPRINT IMPRESSIONS:**

Defendant requests the production of any handwriting or voice exemplars, fingerprint impressions, or other materials obtained by whatever means or process which the government intends to offer into evidence. The government states that laboratory analysis reports have been included in the discovery materials. (Id.). Therefore, this request is **MOOT**.

**13. TRANSCRIPT OF GRAND JURY TESTIMONY:**

Defendant seeks disclosure of grand jury proceedings, including a transcript thereof. "A defendant must show 'particularized need' to justify infringement of the secrecy surrounding a grand jury. . . . Unsubstantiated allegations of grand jury manipulation do not satisfy the 'particularized need' standard." United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 758-59 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Tucker, 526 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1976) (showing of need justifying disclosure of grand jury transcripts must include more than an unsubstantiated assertion of impropriety); see also United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that Eleventh Circuit precedent requires showing of



“particularized need” to obtain disclosure of protected grand jury materials). Defendant has expressed a general desire to review those records but has not even attempted to show a need for them. Accordingly, the request for disclosure of grand jury proceedings is **DENIED**.<sup>3</sup>

**14. DEMAND FOR EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE:**

Defendant seeks the disclosure of exculpatory and impeaching information in accordance with the principles of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). To some extent, Defendant’s request exceeds the scope of Brady. Brady material includes information that is favorable to a defendant and material to the issues of guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). This request is **GRANTED** to the extent that the government must provide all Brady material to Defendant within five (5) days of the date it is received or its existence becomes known. With regard to impeaching information, the government must disclose this information seven (7) days prior to trial.

**15. SUBSTANCE OR PROMISES OR PLEA BARGAINS BETWEEN WITNESSES AND GOVERNMENT:**

In light of the government’s liberal discovery policy, this request is **MOOT**.

**MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS**

In this case, Defendant is charged with one count of Conspiracy to Distribute and to Possess with Intent to Distribute Cocaine Hydrochloride, one count of Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine Hydrochloride, and one count of Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime. Defendant has filed this motion seeking from the

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<sup>3</sup>The Court is aware that the government has stated its intent to provide Jencks Act materials at least seven (7) days prior to trial. (Doc. no. 34, p. 1).

government information concerning the exact time, date and place the alleged crimes as set forth in the indictment occurred; the exact manner that Defendant is alleged to have participated in the conspiracy charged; the places at which each overt act on which the prosecution intends to rely at trial were allegedly performed; each and every act Defendant is alleged to have personally performed; the identification of all of the persons present during each of the acts allegedly performed; and, the identity of any unindicted co-conspirators or co-racketeers known to the government.

Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant may seek from the Court a bill of particulars setting forth the time, place, manner, and means of commission of the crime alleged in the indictment. The purpose of the bill of particulars is to give notice of the offenses charged in the indictment so that a defendant may prepare a defense, avoid surprise, or raise pleas of double jeopardy when the indictment itself is too vague for such purposes. United States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 760 (11th Cir. 1985)). Where necessary, the bill of particulars supplements the indictment by providing the accused with information necessary for trial preparation. Id. Generalized discovery is not a proper purpose in seeking a bill of particulars. United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Colson, 662 F.2d 1389, 1391 (11th Cir. 1981)). Nor is it a device intended to secure for the defense the government's explanation of its theory of the case. United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 898 (5th Cir. 1982). Absent a showing that a defendant cannot prepare a defense without the government providing the identity or identities of an

unindicted co-conspirator(s), such information need not be revealed in response to a motion for a bill of particulars. Warren, 772 F.2d at 837.

The determination of whether a bill of particulars should be ordered may only be decided in light of the particular circumstances of each case. United States v. Davis, 582 F.2d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 1987). The question is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court whose decision will be reversed only where denial of the motion results in surprise to a defendant at trial resulting in prejudice to his substantial rights. United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 451-52 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981). In this case, the government has granted liberal discovery that includes 252 pages and one CD-ROM of discovery materials consisting of the investigation reports of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and the United States Attorney's Office (attorney and agent work product excepted), as well as accelerated Jencks Act disclosures. It is also noted that the indictment in the case is specific and supports each of the requisite elements of the charged offenses. Under these circumstances, information essential to the defense is being provided and the need for particulars is nonexistent. In any event, since discovery material is being made available, a ruling on a bill of particulars would appear to be premature and unnecessary. Discovery should cure any need for additional information to adequately defend the charges. Therefore, Defendant's motion is **DENIED**. (Doc. no. 18).

#### **MOTION FOR EARLY DISCLOSURE OF JENCKS ACT MATERIAL**

The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, requires the government to provide a defendant with statements of witnesses immediately following their testimony in court. There is no authority for the Court to grant an early release or disclosure of that material. United States

v. Schier, 438 F.3d 1104, 1112 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1251 & n.78 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Jimenez, 613 F.2d 1373, 1378 (5th Cir. 1980). However, early disclosure of Jencks Act materials will avoid unnecessary delay and inconvenience to the Court and jury. The government does not oppose the motion. Therefore, the government is **INSTRUCTED** to provide Jencks Act materials seven (7) days prior to trial to provide defense counsel a meaningful opportunity to assess these statements.<sup>4</sup> (Doc. no. 19).

#### **MOTION TO ALLOW PARTICIPATION IN VOIR DIRE**

This motion is **GRANTED**, (doc. no. 20), subject to the following terms and conditions:

(a) Unless otherwise directed by the presiding District Judge, counsel must submit to the Court, not later than 7 days prior to trial, a list of questions which they desire to ask prospective jurors;

(b) Counsel shall take notes and avoid asking duplicative questions, unless additional clarification from a prospective juror is needed; and

(c) Counsel must address the array in the same order which the Court will later formulate for use at trial during the cross-examination of the government's witnesses.

#### **MOTION TO ADOPT THE MOTIONS OF CO-DEFENDANT**

As the only co-defendant in this case did not file any motions, this motion to adopt the motions of the co-defendant is **MOOT**. (Doc. no. 22).

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<sup>4</sup>The Court is aware of the government's disclosure that it has agreed to provide Jencks Act materials, including the grand jury transcript, at least 7 days prior to trial. (Doc. no. 34, p. 1).

**MOTIONS FOR DISCLOSURE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE and  
PRETRIAL HEARING**

In this motion, Defendant seeks the disclosure of all electronic surveillance. The government has indicated that it is not aware of any electronic surveillance having been conducted. (Doc. no. 34, p. 3). Therefore, the motion for disclosure of electronic surveillance and the motion for a pretrial hearing on the electronic surveillance are **MOOT**. (Doc. nos. 24, 25).

**MOTION FOR NOTICE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
INTENTION TO RELY UPON OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE  
PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(b)**

Defendant filed a motion seeking the government to give notice of its intention to use at trial evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The Local Rules provide:

As soon as practicable after the defendant's arraignment, and in any event no more than twenty (20) days after the arraignment (unless the Court directs otherwise), the United States Attorney shall serve upon counsel for the defendant a written notice of any direct or circumstantial evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of the defendant, or specific instances of conduct or criminal convictions of the defendant, which the Government intends to offer into evidence through either Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) or under the theory that the evidence is so inextricably intertwined with defendant's charged offense that it should be admissible.

Loc. Crim. R. 16.2; see also Loc. Crim. R. 12.3.

In its Arraignment Order dated June 23, 2008 (doc. no. 12), the Court directed that if the government intends to use 404(b) evidence, it must make the required disclosures in accordance with the Local Rules. Accordingly, this motion requesting 404(b) disclosures, which the government has already been directed to make, is **MOOT**. (Doc. no. 29).

**MOTION TO RESERVE THE RIGHT  
TO FILE ADDITIONAL MOTIONS**

This motion filed by Defendant is **DENIED**.<sup>5</sup> (Doc. no. 31). The Court ordered that all motions in this case were to be filed within ten (10) days of the date of arraignment and that untimely motions would not be considered absent a showing of good cause for failure to file within the time set by the Court. This Order, however, does not prohibit Defendant from making his showing of cause contemporaneously with the filing of out-of-time motions.

**PRELIMINARY MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS and TO DISMISS**

These motions were filed to preserve Defendant's right to particularize the motions at a later date. (Doc. nos. 26, 27). However, a motion may not be filed outside the deadlines set by this Court at arraignment except by leave of Court upon a showing of cause. United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1509 (11th Cir. 1990); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c), (e). Moreover, the motions were not filed in compliance with Loc. Crim. R. 12.1. On July 11, 2008, the Court issued an order instructing Defendant that if he intended to particularize his motions in accordance with Loc. Crim. R. 12.1, he must do so within ten (10) days. (See doc. no. 37). Defendant failed to file particularized motions. Therefore, these motions are **NULLITIES**. Should Defendant desire to file a particularized motion at a time subsequent to this Order, he must adequately explain his failure to timely file the same.

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<sup>5</sup>The memorandum in support of this motion was mistakenly docketed as a separate motion, and the Clerk is **DIRECTED** to terminate that item (doc. no. 32) from the motions report.

**MOTION FOR RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY and NOTICE OF EXPERT  
TESTIMONY**

These motions filed by the government seek reciprocal discovery from Defendant Mark Anthony Carswell under Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as a written summary of any evidence either Defendant Mark Anthony Carswell or Eddie Lee Carswell intends to offer under Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703, or 705.<sup>6</sup> In light of the government's willingness to provide "open file" discovery, it is entitled to this information. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1). Accordingly, these motions are **GRANTED**. (Doc. nos. 35-1, 35-2).

SO ORDERED this 29th day of August, 2008, at Augusta, Georgia.

  
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W. LEON BARFIELD  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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<sup>6</sup>As only Mark Anthony Carswell filed pretrial motions requesting discovery from the government, and as the government's filing alternately refers to "Defendant" and "Defendants," (doc. no. 35, p. 1), it is not clear whether the government intended the request for "reciprocal" discovery to apply to one or both Defendants in this case. The Court presumes that the "reciprocal" request goes only to Defendant Mark Anthony Carswell, and the Clerk is **DIRECTED** to **TERMINATE** the "reciprocal" motion from the motions report as to Defendant Eddie Lee Carswell. (Doc. no. 35-1).